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Government borrowing is pointless where a 
Government Issues its own Currency. 
Ralph Musgrave. 
 
Abstract.   
The alleged justifications for government borrowing in a country which issues its own 
currency are examined here. The conclusion is that no justification exists for 
borrowing money in the normal sense of the phrase “borrow money”: that is, the use 
by one entity of money loaned by another entity, and so as to fund expenditure by 
the first entity.  In contrast, and where a deflationary stance is required, it is 
justifiable for government (or as is more usual, the central bank) to borrow in the 
sense of withdrawing funds from the private sector and purely so as to stop those 
funds being spent. Moreover, inflation destroys a proportion of the money 
“borrowed”. Plus government effectively confiscates (via tax) the money needed to 
pay interest on this “borrowed” money. This is essentially a money shredding 
operation. This is not the normal meaning of the word borrow.  
Many of the points made here apply to the central bank of a common currency area.  
Individual countries within a common currency area are not considered.  
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Introduction: the lack of justifications for government borrowing. 
One of the main alleged justifications for government borrowing is that it helps 
regulate aggregate demand: Keynsian “borrow and spend”. This justification makes 
little sense, as is shown below. Other justifications for borrowing are thin on the 
ground: they are a long way from being backed by a string of economics Nobel 
laureates.  
I have three standard economics text books used by first year university students, 
each with six to eight hundred pages (Alchain (1974), Lipsey (1999) and Sloman 
(2000). “Borrow and spend” apart, the only justification given in these books for 
borrowing is that governments sometimes find themselves unexpectedly short of 
income. This argument, plausible as it sounds, does not stand inspection, as is 
shown below.  
Hundreds of articles and papers have been published which deal with government 
borrowing, and which go into numerous complex issues related to government 
borrowing. Borrow and spend apart, none of them seem to address in any depth the 
basic question as to why governments borrow.  
There is even a book advertised as specifically addressing this question (McDonald 
(2006)). Two reviewers (see Note 1 at the end) claim that McDonald “starts with 
some fundamental questions: Why do governments borrow....” 
These reviewers are wrong. McDonald’s work is a well researched HISTORY of 
government borrowing, but does not answer the above fundamental question. 
 
Abba Lerner and Milton Friedman. 
The idea that government borrowing makes little sense is not new. Friedman (1948: 
p.250) makes this suggestion. 
And Abba Lerner is widely credited with being one the first to claim that government 
borrowing is pointless in that funding government expenditure is not the main 
purpose of government borrowing.  
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The arguments below do not attempt to improve on Lerner’s ideas: rather, the 
purpose is to consider the alternative ideas, that is the conventional and alleged 
justifications for government borrowing, and to show that they do not stand 
inspection. Put another way, the objective is to show that Lerner’s ideas do not face 
strong opposition. 
 
Tax and print money. 
The fundamental weakness in the idea that governments need to borrow is the fact 
that governments have access to almost limitless funds from tax (plus a smaller 
source of funds: money printing or “seigniorage”). 
Some advocates of borrowing might want to answer this by turning the latter 
argument on its head. That is, why not argue that tax is questionable given the 
extremely large sums that governments can borrow? 
The answer to this is that in the long run, say ten years or more, the vast bulk of 
government funds inevitably come from tax. That is, in recent decades, most 
countries’ national debts have hovered very roughly around half of GDP: that is 
about one twentieth or less of total funds that the government of a typical country 
needs over a ten year period. And debt to GDP ratios much more than the above 
“half” are regarded by markets as undesirable. 
Given this lack of importance of borrowing in the long term, the question arises: why 
borrow at all? That is, the onus is on advocates of borrowing to justify themselves, 
not on the advocates to tax to justify themselves. 
 
Money Printing. 
Having claimed above that government borrowing needs to be justified because of 
its relative insignificance, the same charge could be made against money printing. 
The justifications for money printing relied on here are the conventional or text book 
ones, which briefly are as follows. 
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First, as an economy expands in real terms it will require a larger money supply (in 
real terms). Second there is a consensus that inflation of about 2% is optimum. Thus 
the amount of printing needed per year (assuming growth of say 2%) will be roughly 
4% of a country’s monetary base (2% + 2%).  
Also it makes sense for governments to vary the proportion of funds they obtain from 
tax as opposed to money printing, depending on the circumstances. And this 
proportion can vary dramatically: the monetary base expansion of both the UK and 
US in 2009 was unprecedented and this was the correct response the current 
recession. And conversely, if this expanded monetary base looks like contributing to 
excessive inflation in say 2011 or 2012, this may warrant a monetary base 
contraction as dramatic as the above mentioned expansion. 
Moreover even the above dramatic monetary base increase was not enough, 
according to some, e.g. Galbraith (2009) and Tavakoli (2009). 
In contrast to the above claim that the monetary base should be expanded in a 
recession, there is of course Milton Friedman’s argument that governments are so 
hopeless at organising counter cyclical measures that it would be better if they did 
not try. This is doubtless a good point, on the other hand, given a serious recession, 
the political reality is that governments cannot stand by and do nothing. 
 
The closed economy assumption. 
It is assumed here, unless otherwise stated, that we are dealing with a closed 
economy. This assumption is not too unrealistic: that is, most of the arguments 
below apply to open economies, but in slightly altered form.  
For example as regards national debt, about three quarters of the UK’s national debt 
is in the hands of UK nationals, not foreigners. And even to the extent that UK 
national debt IS held by foreigners, this is approximately balanced by the amount of 
foreign government national debt held by UK nationals. 
The US is obviously different in that other countries, China and Japan in particular, 
hold around half of US national debt at the time of writing. However, this is a recent 
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development. It was not till around 1995 that foreign holdings of US debt rose above 
the 20% level. However, in view of this large recent rise in the proportion of US 
government debt held by non-US entities, there is a section below devoted to the 
question as to whether it makes sense for governments to borrow from abroad. 
 
The flawed justifications for government borrowing. 
Various alleged justifications for government borrowing will now be examined, and in 
no particular order. 
Riley (2006) gives two reasons or sets of reasons for government borrowing. The 
first is thus. 
“Government borrowing can benefit economic growth: A budget deficit can have 
positive macroeconomic effects in the long run if it is used to finance extra capital 
spending that leads to an increase in the stock of national assets. For example, 
higher spending on the transport infrastructure improves the supply-side capacity of 
the economy promoting long-run growth. And increased public-sector investment in 
health and education can bring positive effects on labour productivity and 
employment. The social benefits of increased capital spending can be estimated 
through use of cost-benefit analysis.” 
The first flaw in this argument is that governments do not HAVE to borrow in order to 
fund capital projects. As already pointed out, they can easily fund such projects via 
tax. Indeed according to Kellerman (2007), the “social opportunity cost”, (as 
Kellerman calls it) of financing public investment via borrowing is normally higher 
than via tax. 
As to Riley’s points about “long run growth” and “cost-benefit analysis”, these are 
irrelevant. It is obviously true that capital projects should pass cost benefit tests, and 
that if they pass such tests, “long run growth” should ensue. But neither of these 
points in themselves are arguments for any particular method of financing 
government.  
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Does borrowing facilitate aggregate demand management? 
The second justification for government borrowing given by Riley is the popular one 
mentioned near the outset above:  Keynsian “borrow and spend” is allegedly a good 
way of managing demand.  
However, there is a HUGE problem here, namely that there is a large amount of 
argument as to what extent “borrowing and spend” actually works. For example, it is 
plausible that “borrow and spend” does NOT influence demand because of the well 
known “crowding out” effect. 
On the other hand it is equally plausible that borrow and spend DOES raise demand 
in that this activity may get a relatively slow moving money supply moving. (The 
velocity of circulation of money fell 72% in New York between 1929 and 1932). 
But given the large uncertainties surrounding borrow and spend, it is almost lunatic 
to use this tool at all. And another absurd aspect of “borrow and spend” as a means 
to stimulate an economy is that the “borrow” part is quite clearly deflationary. Now if 
the objective is to stimulate or reflate an economy, what is the point of doing 
something which, at least to some extent, has the opposite of the desired effect?  
The purpose of having a bath is the clean oneself (forgive the statement of the 
obvious). Is there any point in throwing dirt into the bathwater before climbing in? 
Obviously not. “Dirt”, so to speak, is the opposite of “clean” is it not? 
Conclusion: given the uncertainties surrounding “borrow and spend”, this is a strange 
policy to adopt. It would make more sense either to employ interest rate reductions, 
or to concentrate on the part of “borrow and spend” which quite clearly DOES have 
an effect, that is the “spend” part. Put another way, “print and spend” is a far more 
logical policy (a sentiment shared by Hillinger (2010: 3 & 21). 
The latter policy is effectively what the UK “government / central bank machine” did 
in response to the recession in 2009. That is the UK national debt expanded by 
around £200bn in 2009; but around ninety nine percent of this sum was 
quantitatively eased. Thus the net effect was simply to print £200bn. (Any readers 
not clear on this point please see note 2 at the end). 
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Extinguishing money. 
“Borrow and spend” is allegedly a way to boost demand, but as was shown above, 
there are big question marks over this policy. That is, straightforward “print and 
spend” would be more certain in its effects. 
This raises an apparent problem. When economies overheat, governments need to 
adopt a deflationary stance. If government borrowing is abolished or severely 
curtailed, one of the main traditional methods of damping demand, namely interest 
rate increases, might seem to have been destroyed. 
The answer to this alleged problem is that no criticism is being made here of another 
activity, sometimes called “borrowing”, namely a central bank raising interest rates, 
and enforcing this interest rate rise by announcing to the markets that it will pay a 
higher percentage by way of interest to anyone wanting to “lend” funds to the central 
bank. 
The difference between the latter and more normal borrowing is that nothing is done, 
or at least nothing SHOULD be done with the money so attracted. Indeed, the mere 
fact of doing nothing with such money means that the money is to some extent 
extinguished or shredded, because the longer the money is “borrowed”, the more 
does inflation erode its value. 
In addition, while this takes place, the “government central bank machine” effectively 
confiscates money from the private sector to pay for interest on the “borrowed” 
money. 
To expand on the latter point a little, where a central bank pays interest on 
“borrowed” money, the money for this interest must come from somewhere. Since 
central banks normally make a profit, which is normally handed over the government 
periodically, the money for the above interest will simply reduce this profit. That is, 
government’s income is reduced, which in turn means less government spending on 
roads, schools etc. Alternatively, if spending on the latter is to be held constant, then 
taxes have to be raised.  
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To summarise, both the OBJECTIVE and to a greater or lesser degree the actual 
EFFECT of the above operation is simply to confiscate money from the private 
sector and destroy it. This is not “borrowing” on any normal meaning of the word. 
Finally, there is the problem that higher interest rates attract money from abroad and 
interest has to be paid on this. This represents a real cost for the country concerned. 
On the other hand, this problem occurs just as much with borrowing in the 
conventional sense of the word, so this is not a problem specific to “borrowing with a 
view to shredding”.  
 
Does borrowing make those who benefit from the associated investment pay 
for such investment? 
Many government financed investments (roads, hospitals, etc) endure at least a 
generation, and sometimes a century or more. Obviously it would be fair to make 
those who benefit decades in the future from such investments pay their fair share. 
And on the face of it, one way of doing this is to finance such projects with borrowed 
money, and gradually pay back the capital sum. This way, future generations do as 
much “paying back” as the current generation.  
But there is a flaw in this argument: it is a plain physical impossibility to have future 
generations produce the concrete, steel and so on needed to build roads or bridges 
this year or next. And having new born babies or the as yet unborn supply labour to 
build roads and bridges is a problem too! 
The only way to have future generations in one country to pay for today’s investment 
would be for the country to borrow the capital sum from some other country, and 
gradually pay the money back, as pointed out by Musgrave (1939: 269). (That is not 
me, nor a relative!).  
But if every country adopts the latter policy, it becomes self defeating. 
Moreover we all benefit from investments made by previous generations where the 
relevant debt has long been paid off. For example one very large investment of this 
sort is education: capital costs apart, these costs are normally born and paid off 
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annually (e.g. teachers’ salaries).  Thus trying to allocate the costs of investments to 
each generation in any sort of accurate way is a bureaucratic nightmare. It is 
probably simpler just to accept that each generation inherits huge benefits from 
previous generations, and that each generation should “leave the world as it found 
it”, that is fund and pass on a roughly equivalent amount of investment to succeeding 
generations. 
To summarise, having future generations pay for the investments they inherit is, first, 
almost a physical impossibility, and second, even were it possible, the idea is 
probably more trouble than it is worth. 
 
Does borrowed money come from the wealthy? 
An attraction of borrowing for politicians is that most of them probably think that 
borrowed money comes from the cash rich or the wealthy. Certainly politicians who 
want to ingrate themselves with the majority of the electorate, that is those on 
average incomes or less, will be attracted by this idea. 
The above is a plausible idea: after all, where can government possibly get cash 
from other than those with cash to spare? However, there are flaws in this argument, 
as follows.  
When interest rates are raised so as to attract funds to government coffers, there are 
three potential sources of funds: 1, additional saving by lenders, 2, forgone 
borrowing by borrowers, and 3, idle cash or an increased velocity of circulation of 
money. 
As regards the last, No. 3, there is a big problem. As already pointed out, where this 
source of funds operates, the effect is an increase in aggregate demand. And we are 
not concerned with increasing demand: we are concerned to have government 
borrow and increase its spending OTHER THINGS BEING EQUAL. That is, the 
assumption is CONSTANT demand. 
Thus to the extent that increasing interest rates does increase the velocity of 
circulation and hence increase demand, this will have to be negated by further rate 
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rises combined with the money shredding type of borrowing. Indeed this simply 
reflects the brute physical fact, already pointed out, namely that, increased 
consumption by government must be matched by reduced consumption by the 
private sector. Thus No. 3 is ruled out as a source of funds. 
That leaves Nos 1 and 2, that is, additional saving by lenders and forgone borrowing 
by borrowers. 
Taking lenders first, it is implausible that this reduced consumption by lenders takes 
place, plus the evidence seems to support this implausibility. That is, lenders (just 
like the rest of the population) are well aware that interest rates constantly rise and 
fall. Thus given an interest rate rise, are they really going to forgo their annual skiing 
holiday so as to put the money saved into the bank and get an extra £5 a year of 
interest next year?” And £5 is about all they would get.  
It seems far more likely that any reduced personal consumption is effected by 
borrowers, not lenders. Amongst other reasons this is because it is much easier for 
borrowers to make large and sudden reductions in borrowing than for lenders to 
make large and sudden increases in saving. For example postponing borrowing 
money with which to buy a new car, and instead running the old car for a year or two 
is easy. Indeed, a large number of would be borrowers did this in the early part of the 
current recession, and car manufacturers were in trouble as a result, though this 
problem was alleviated by various “cash for clunkers” schemes later on. 
In addition to households who forgo loans, given a small interest rate rise, some 
firms will do likewise, that is, postpone or abandon investments. And as with 
households, this is easy to do: at least it is easy in the sense that it does not take a 
genius to abstain from arranging a loan to buy some machinery.  
Moreover, the evidence seems to support the idea that interest rates have little 
influence on saving. See Japelli (2002) p. 12). 
As to borrowing, Martins (2003) found that household borrowing is strongly 
influenced by interest rates. Alessie et al. (2005) found the same.  
A second flaw in the idea that borrowed money comes from those with cash to 
spare, is that whoever forgoes consumption in order to fund government will ipso 
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facto reduce the incomes of those who would have supplied the relevant goods had 
this consumption taken place. To illustrate, households which abstain from ordering 
new kitchens because they cannot afford the finance will reduce the income and 
consumption of those running and working for kitchen improvement firms, and the 
latters’ suppliers. 
To summarise, both the evidence and the theory seem to indicate that additional 
borrowing by government is funded mainly by reduced borrowing by the private 
sector, rather than by increased saving by the private sector. Thus it does not seem 
to be the cash rich who fund government borrowing. But even if this claim is wrong, 
the whole question as to who forgoes consumption when government borrows rather 
than taxes is certainly complicated.  
 
Another political argument: passing the buck to successors. 
In addition to the above argument about making future generations pay a fair share 
of the cost of investments, there is the similar argument (popular with politicians, no 
doubt), namely that borrowing somehow “delays the day of reckoning”. Unlike the 
above “investment” argument, this “buck passing” argument could be applied to 
current as well as capital spending. That is, borrowing might seem like a way of 
bestowing favours on the current electorate, while leaving the allegedly difficult task 
of repaying the debt to successor politicians and future taxpayers.  
Indeed, there is evidence that the motives for borrowing are political, rather than 
properly thought out economic reasons. Roubini and Sachs (1989, p. 931) show that 
the higher the number of parties in a coalition government, the higher is public debt. 
Put another way, a single party with a decent majority can afford to engage in “tough 
love” (or what appears to be tough love), that is, raise taxes so as to repay national 
debt. 
The flaw in this “buck passing” idea is the “physical impossibility” point (set out 
above). That is, the real sacrifice is made while the spending that corresponds to the 
money borrowed takes place: and it makes no difference whether the expenditure is 
of a capital or current nature. 
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To illustrate the latter “current” point, there is no way of having those who will be 
born in 2015 make a contribution to generating electricity that is consumed in 
government offices in 2010. Moreover, this “physical impossibility” point should show 
up, as it were, in the economic theory. And it does, as follows. 
Take an economy which is working at capacity or full employment. Regardless of 
whether an item of government spending is financed by tax or borrowing, there is no 
way the materials for this investment can be obtained other than by withdrawing 
resources from the rest of the economy. That is, given that the economy is at 
capacity, additional demand for materials and additional demands on the labour 
market will simply be inflationary. 
In short, the “buck passing” idea is nonsense. 
 
Appearances versus reality. 
There is of course a possible weakness in the above claims that borrowing rather 
than tax brings little benefit for politicians trying to ingratiate themselves with the 
electorate. This is that the electorate may THINK borrowing is preferable to tax. 
However the objective here is to deal with reality, not with the electorate’s ideas as to 
what constitutes reality.  
If the electorate is deluded, the electorate needs educating.  A properly functioning 
democracy involves, first, the electorate having a good grasp of the reasons for 
government decisions, and second, the electorate expressing its views on such 
decisions. 
 
The sudden large expenditure argument. 
One fully justifiable reason that households or firms borrow is that they do not have 
the cash to make purchases that are large relative to their annual income. For 
example someone buying a house will typically spend around three to five times their 
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annual income on the purchase. That is a very good reason to borrow: indeed, in 
most cases there is no option BUT to borrow. 
Government, in contrast, is in a totally different position. The TOTAL of government 
spending on capital projects per year is an almost entirely predictable sum which is 
much less than half of total government income. Moreover, while some investments 
(like power stations or motorways) are certainly large, the construction and thus the 
expenditure normally take place over several years.   
 
Does the erratic timing of tax receipts within each year justify borrowing? 
Governments do not receive a constant amount from tax each month. And 
government spending can vary in a similarly erratic manner from month to month. 
This leads some to claim that governments need to borrow during those parts of the 
year when receipts from tax are on the low side and/or spending is higher than 
normal. The quick answer to this is that given a short term lack of income, 
government can easily print money; then, a few months later, when income exceeds 
spending, government can do the opposite, that is rein in money and extinguish it.  
It could be claimed that the latter money printing would be inflationary. However, 
there are flaws in this argument. 
First, inflation is unlikely to take off just because the money supply is more than 
optimum for three months and then an equivalent amount below this level for the 
next three months. 
The next flaw involves Ricardian equivalence of a sort: that is, where a private sector 
entity knows there is a £Y tax liability in the pipeline and has sufficient cash to meet 
this liability, that entity is unlikely to blow the £Y on frivolities. 
This argument gains support from examining what might be called the counterparties 
to the regular annual government shortages and surpluses of income. These 
counterparties are very definitely not the sort of people who might blow a temporary 
excess of cash. 
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For example a significant proportion of people living on benefits might spend any 
temporary excess cash; however a large majority of these people (at least in the UK 
– pensioners or those on invalidity benefit) receive a fairly regular income from the 
state and thus do not cause erratic changes in government net income. 
As to a slightly more responsible or talented or lucky section of the population, 
employees, this section of the population also has a regular income. As to income 
tax, this is deducted from wages and salaries, both where wages are paid weekly 
and where paid monthly (at least in the UK). Thus this section of the population does 
not contribute much to changes in government income either. 
Finally, the sections of the economy which really cause the irregularities in 
government income are corporations and the self employed. These sections of the 
economy (at least in the UK) pay tax on profits once or twice per year. And there are 
penalties for late payment. However, it is precisely this section that is least likely to 
blow a temporary excess of cash. Any corporation or self employed person with a 
propensity for this sort of behaviour will not last long in business.  
Conclusion: the variations in government net income through the year are not a 
reason for government to borrow. 
 
Open economies. 
In view of the large amount of US national debt which governments and other non-
US entities have bought in the last decade, the question obviously arises as to 
whether government borrowing from abroad makes sense. 
Where the private sector in a particular country finds that foreigners are willing to 
lend at a rate of interest below the prevailing rate in the country concerned and 
makes use of this cheap finance, this is a straightforward free market transaction. 
Unless there is are reasons to suspect market failure, there can be no objection to 
this transaction.  
As to whether it makes sense for the GOVERNMENT of the relevant country to 
borrow from abroad, the excuses are weak in the extreme, because as has been 
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shown in the above paragraphs, the various alleged reasons for government 
borrowing no not stand inspection. At least, there are no good reasons for borrowing 
in the normal sense of the word, i.e. “attracting funds to finance expenditure”. 
Moreover, if a government DOES borrow from abroad, this inevitably reduces the 
amount it needs to raise from tax or borrowing from domestic sources. Thus if a 
government does implement this policy, it is effectively just acting as an intermediate 
between foreign lenders and domestic private sector borrowers. And it is not 
government’s job to do this. That is, if a citizen or corporation in a particular country 
needs to borrow, it is up to the relevant citizen or corporation to sort out the best 
deal, and not expect government to do this job or even influence the decision, unless 
market failure can be demonstrated.  
 
No borrowing means no liquidity traps. 
There is not perfect agreement amongst economists as to what a liquidity trap is, but 
it will be taken here to mean a situation where a recession persists despite zero or 
near zero interest rates, and no more can be done (at least with interest rates) 
because they cannot be reduced any further.  
Certainly interest rates are at the time of writing at or near zero in several major 
economies, there has been much discussion as to whether we are in a liquidity trap. 
The only option in this scenario, according to the conventional wisdom is borrow and 
spend. But as explained above, there are doubts as to how well borrow and spend 
works. 
That leaves a third option: print and spend which is guaranteed to work. Given 
constantly rising cash holdings (or declining debts) in the hands of households, such 
households must at some point begin to spend their newly acquired wealth. The 
average building site labourer has worked out that when people win a lottery, they 
tend to spend the proceeds, though it seems a significant proportion of economists 
have not worked this out.  
In contrast to the economists who do not realise that people tend to spend cash 
windfalls,  there are a host of economists who have grasped this point and who thus 
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advocated channelling stimulus directly to households right at the start of the current 
recession, e.g. Spilimbergo (2008, section 16, p. 6) and Surowiecki (2009).  
 
The serious mistake argument. 
Government plans regarding total expenditure and the total collected via tax for a 
particular year can go badly wrong. For example the total collected via tax can turn 
out to be much less than anticipated. In this event, is borrowing justified? 
Given the above mistake, the mistake should be rectified with as little dislocation to 
the economy as possible. This means, in the case of inadequate income from tax, 
upping taxation as quickly as possible.  
Changing the source of government revenue results in a series of other changes to 
the economy: changes in the pattern of supply and demand for various products, for 
example. This means people having to change jobs, and learn new skills in some 
cases. This in turn means a temporary rise in the “natural level of unemployment” or 
the “Non Accelerating Inflation Level of Unemployment”. 
If changing the shape of an economy, or changing the patterns of supply and 
demand are deemed to be in the long term interest of a country, no objections can 
be raised. But it is undesirable to make these changes, for example by having a 
significant portion of government income come from borrowing in one year, only to 
abandon or reverse this change next year. For example when interest rates are 
altered, this means dislocations for the building industry because house sales are 
heavily dependent on the ease with which people can get mortgages. 
And raising or lowering taxes at short notice should not be difficult. The UK 
temporarily reduced VAT during the current recession. And a payroll tax holiday has 
been widely advocated as a way of getting the U.S. out of its recession.  
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Conclusion. 
There is little reason for government to borrow money in the normal sense of the 
phrase “borrow money”: that is, using someone else’s funds to finance spending 
(capital or current spending). 
In contrast, there is another possible use of the word “borrow”. This consists of 
government (or more usually a central bank) attracting money away from the private 
sector with a view to doing nothing with such money, apart from shredding as much 
of it as possible. This is not the normal meaning of the word borrow. This latter policy 
is justified where a deflationary stance is required.  
__________________ 
 
 
Note 1. 
 The two reviews of McDonald’s book which claim that McDonald addresses the 
question as to why governments borrow are thus: 1, http://www.2think.org/debt.shtml  
and 2,  the publishers, MacMillan: http://us.macmillan.com/afreenationdeepindebt.   
For a longer and better review by Jonathan Dolhenty, see:  
http://www.radicalacademy.com/bookreviewmacdonald.htm 
 
Note 2.  
Government borrowing and spending £Z consists of the following three stages. 1, 
government borrows £Z. 2, government gives £Z worth of government securities to 
those it has borrowed from. 3, government spends the £Z on the usual items: 
schools, roads, etc. 
Quantitative easing (assuming it is government securities that are quantitatively 
eased, rather than private sector securities) consists of the central bank printing £Z 
and buying back the above £Z of securities. 
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Thus quantitative easing cancels items 1 and 2 above. Thus there is only one net 
effect: item 3. That is, the only net effect is “government prints and spends £Z”. 
Of course there is one other “net effect” namely that the central bank is left holding 
£Z of government securities. I.e. the government supposedly “owes” the central bank 
£Z. But this is a nonsense: both institutions (government and central bank) are 
owned by the people. 
To call these securities a “debt” is as nonsensical as saying that shifting £10 from 
your left hand trouser pocket to the right hand trouser pocket means the latter owes 
the former £10. 
Indeed, in the particular case of the UK, the Bank of England, is legally owned by the 
UK Treasury. That is the Treasury owns all the shares in the Bank of England.  
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